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Abstract
In many markets, consumers obtain price quotes before making purchases. This paper
considers a xed-sample size model of consumer search for price quotes when sellers must spend
resources to learn the costs of providing goods/services. It is found that (1) even with ex ante
identical consumers and sellers, there is price dispersion in the equilibrium; (2) despite price
dispersion and zero search costs, it may be optimal to search just two sellers; (3) the optimal
number of searches can increase with sellers information costs; (4) the expected equilibrium
price can decrease with consumerssearch costs. (JEL D40, L00)
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In order to make informed purchase decisions, consumers search. In order to earn their business,
sellers provide relevant information such as prices. The standard economic models of consumer
search assume that price search is costly, but price setting is costless.1 In many markets, however,
even a simple price quote may involve nontrivial costs for the seller. For example, a repair shop must
diagnose the problem before giving a cost estimate; a mortgage lender must evaluate a borrowers
creditworthiness before issuing a rate quote; an insurance agent must assess an applicants risk
characteristics before determining the premium; a travel agent has to compare di¤erent itineraries
and consult with multiple airlines before o¤ering an airfare deal. In these markets, production costs
depend on consumersindividual needs. Sellers set prices after consumer search takes place. The
search process works much like a rst-price sealed-bid procurement auction: each seller submits a
bid without knowing his competitorsbids and the consumer pays a price equal to the lowest bid.
A consumer can canvass a number of sellers, but cannot contract on any sellers e¤ort in preparing
the price quote.
This paper incorporates the above features into a model of consumer search to study the market
impact of precontract costs, including consumer search cost and price setting cost. The latter cost
is due to uncertainty in the production cost. As such, we call it information cost or diagnosis cost.
For concreteness, consider a homeowner who asks contractors for price quotes on a repair job.2 A
contractor may send an unskilled worker or a skilled worker. Sending the skilled worker gives an
accurate diagnosis, but is costly and potentially duplicative. The homeowner cannot distinguish
the skilled from the unskilled worker. If the contractor expects the homeowner to do comparison
shopping and canvass a large number of contractors, then he will be less inclined to send the
skilled worker. In the equilibrium, the expected prots net of diagnosis costs from sending the
skilled worker must be the same as the prots from sending the unskilled worker. This means
that diagnosis costs will be built into the nal price quotes. While this observation suggests an
equivalence between consumer search and contractor diagnosis  both are paid by the consumer
 our analysis of the contractors problem reveals an important di¤erence: the only way to save
on total search costs is to search less, but paradoxically a consumer can save on total diagnosis
1 It is a long tradition that began with Stiglers seminal paper (1961). More recently, a class of search models with
an "information clearinghouse" assume nearly the opposite, that is, zero (marginal) search cost but positive (xed)
advertising cost (Baye and Morgan 2001).
2This example is adapted from Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003). Their original example assumes that the costs of
performing any potential services are identical, but the outcomes can be di¤erent. Our example assumes the opposite.
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costs by searching more. The latter is true if the contractorswillingness to incur diagnosis costs
drops sharply when they face more competitors. Consequently, information costs and search costs
can have di¤erent, even opposite, impacts on consumer search behavior. For example, the optimal
number of searches is two when information costs are zero, but can be innity when search costs
are zero. More generally, while the optimal number of searches always decreases with search costs,
it can sometimes increase with information costs. At the same time, price dispersion persists even
with ex ante identical consumers and sellers, and even if search is costless.
The introduction of price setting costs also a¤ects the timing of the game, which raises a commit-
ment issue that has not been previously investigated. When prices are set upon consumer request,
the game between the consumer and sellers can either be sequential in nature, or simultaneous,
depending on whether the consumer can commit. If a consumer can precommit to the number of
searches before sellers submit their bids, then the number of searches will be optimal, but this is
not always the case. Holding constant the sellerspricing strategies, a searcher always benets from
sampling a larger size, and therefore she cannot make a credible commitment when the number of
price quotes is private information. In this setting, we nd that the expected price can decrease
with search costs. Moreover, consumers may engage in excessive search that is detrimental to their
own welfare.
This paper contributes to the understanding of transaction costs. Dahlman (1979) classies
transaction costs into three categories based on the stages of a contract: search and information
costs (precontract), bargaining and decision costs (contract), policing and enforcement costs (post-
contract). While the impact of consumer search costs on market outcome has been extensively
studied,3 its interaction with sellersinformation costs has so far received scant attention. A no-
table exception is French and McKormick (1984), whose informal analysis of the service market
anticipates many of the themes explored in this paper. After showing that the winners expected
prot equals the sum of his competitorssunk costs of bid preparation under a free-entry condition,
they argue that consumers indirectly pay for sellersinformation costs. The focus of their paper,
3See Anderson and Renault (2017) for a recent survey of consumer search theories and Baye, Morgan and Scholten
(2006) for an extensive review of the search literature that focuses on price dispersion.
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however, is on sellersmarketing strategies, such as how likely sellers charge for their estimates or
advertise, whereas the focus of this paper is on the problem faced by the consumer side.4
To the best of our knowledge, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) andWolinsky (2005) are the only
other papers that consider consumer search in the presence of information costs. By assuming that
repair outcomes are not contractible (but price searches are costless), Pesendorfer and Wolinsky
(2003) examine market ine¢ ciencies when a consumer must rely on second opinions to pick the right
contractor. Under the assumption that sellers can provide better matching via costly investments,
Wolinsky (2005) shows that consumersinability to internalize sellerscosts leads to excessive search.
Despite the similarity, these two papers have a di¤erent focus than ours: they are concerned with
prior information on product characteristics (so there is no price dispersion), whereas our paper is
concerned with prior information on prices. Because of this di¤erence, most of our results on prices
do not exist in their models.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the model and discusses
assumptions. Section 2 presents some preliminary results. Section 3 analyzes equilibrium properties
and shows our main results. Section 4 concludes. Any formal proofs omitted from the main text
are contained in the appendix.
1 The Model
A consumer is willing to pay v for a good or service (henceforth, the product), which can be
provided by any one of the N sellers. In order to nd the best deal, the consumer visits sellers to
collect price quotes. The cost of e¤ort for each visit is s, i.e., the search cost. Sellers face the same
production cost, but it can take two values: a low cost of cl with a probability of q or a high cost of
ch with a probability of 1  q: A seller can acquire information to learn the actual production cost
at a cost of t; i.e., the information cost. Sellers are risk neutral. The values of all above variables
are assumed to be common knowledge.
The game is played in the following order:
4Due to the lack of formal game-theoretic analysis, the connection between assumptions and results is somewhat
opaque in their paper. For example, it is not clear whether the predicted pattern is the result of collective behavior
among sellers or the noncooperative outcome.
5For tractability, these two models make two assumptions that are somewhat unrealistic: (1) prices are set before
diagnoses; (2) search costs are not paid until a contract o¤er is accepted.
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1. The consumer requests prices quotes from n sellers;
2. Each seller, upon request, chooses whether to incur t to acquire information about the produc-
tion cost: if a seller acquires information, it quotes a price from the distribution of either Fl (p)
or Fh (p), depending on whether the cost is cl or ch; if a seller does not acquire information,
it quotes a price from the distribution of Fb (p) :
3. After receiving all price quotes, the consumer buys from the seller that o¤ers the lowest price.
A complete specication of the game also requires us to specify whether n belongs to the sellers
information set when they compete at stage 2. If n is publicly observable, then the consumer can act
as a Stackelberg leader and commit to the optimal number of searches; but if n is non-contractible
private information, then the consumer and sellers will be playing a simultaneous move game. Both
possibilities will be considered.
We focus on symmetric equilibria, in which sellers choose the same bidding strategy, and restrict
our attention to equilibria in which the consumer uses a pure strategy, i.e., the consumer does not
randomize over her number of searches. It is also not di¢ cult to see that Fh (p) is a degenerate
distribution, where Fh (p) = 0 for p < ch and Fh (p) = 1 for p  ch: Therefore, the equilibrium will
be characterized by the consumers choice of n and sellersstrategies in a triplet f; Fl (p) ; Fb (p)g ;
where  is the probability of a seller choosing to acquire information about the production cost,
Fl (p) is the cumulative distribution function of price quote when a seller learns that the production
cost is low, and Fb (p) is the distribution function when a seller submits a "blind" quote. Sellers use
pure strategies in pricing if and only if price distributions are degenerate. The solution concept is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The consumer and sellers form beliefs about each others strategies.
In the equilibrium, their beliefs are correct.
For ease of exposition, we impose the following restrictions on parameter values. First, we
assume that s << v so that it is never optimal for the consumer to search just one seller, in which
case she minimizes the total search costs but has to pay a monopoly price for the product. Second,
we assume that the pool of sellers is so large that the consumers number of searches is never
constrained by the number of sellers. These restrictions cut down the number of cases we have
to consider and allow us to focus on only the nontrivial cases, but they do not change any of the
qualitative results.
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1.1 Discussion of Assumptions
In order to keep the model tractable and have a stark contrast with the existing literature, this
paper has introduced a very simple model that focuses on only the most important aspects of the
markets and assumes away some of the admittedly more realistic features. Here we discuss the key
assumptions and justify the use of some simplifying assumptions.
Homogenous Sellers At the last stage of the game, the consumer choice is based on price
only. This is a common assumption in the consumer search literature. At the same time, it is a
natural assumption given the papers focus on the transaction costs at the precontract stage. After
all, without having to incur additional transaction costs at later stages, sellers can o¤er complete
contracts that cover all aspects of the product, including design, quality, warranty, price, etc. This
means that we can collapse all these variables into a single one  "price"  and assume all other
aspects of the product to be uniform across sellers. Essentially, sellers can be viewed as competing
in utility space.
At the bidding stage, the game is modeled as a common value procurement auction since sellers
are assumed to be ex ante identical. This may not be a realistic assumption: sellers costs are
likely correlated, but not necessarily the same. Nonetheless, we make this assumption to ensure
that equilibrium price dispersion cannot be attributed to di¤erent cost realizations across sellers.
The assumption of homogenous sellers is also consistent with empirical research in related
markets. For example, in her study of the auto insurance market, Honka (2014) assumes that the
only search dimension is the premium charged by each provider. Moreover, she reports that over
93% of consumers kept their coverage choice the same during the last shopping occasion and were
searching only for the lowest premium. Similarly, in their study of the Canadian mortgage market,
Allen, Clark and Houde (2014) nd that contracts are homogeneous, and for a given consumer costs
are mostly common across lenders due to loan securitization and a government insurance program.
Uncertainty in Production Cost The production cost is assumed to be a binary random
variable for tractability. Admittedly, this is a crude assumption, but it is in line with the home
repair example. For other markets, it is also relevant: a mortgage broker or an insurance agents
precontract e¤ort involves identifying the variety of discounts available to an applicant based on
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her risk characteristics; a travel agent or a car dealers e¤ort involves nding out the existence of
airline promotions or manufacturer incentives. The same assumption is also used by Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (2003). As for the source of the cost uncertainty, it can be internal, (i.e., consumer
specic), or external, (e.g., due to input cost variations).
Fixed-sample Size Search There are two basic types of models used in the search literature:
xed-sample size search models assume that consumers sample a xed number of sellers and choose
to buy the lowest priced alternative,6 whereas sequential search models assume that consumers
visit sellers one-by-one and do not stop searching until their reservation prices are met.
There are several reasons why we assume xed-sample size search. First, existing empirical
evidence suggests that xed-sample size search provides a more accurate description of observed
consumer search behavior (De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest 2012, Honka and Chinta-
gunta 2017); second, xed-sample size search strategies can be optimal when there is a xed-cost
component to search (Hong and Shum 2006). Recall the example of a homeowner in need of repair
cost estimates: if she has to take a day o¤ from work for the visits of the contractors, then it will
be more e¢ cient to schedule the visits such that they all take place on the same day than to follow
a prolonged process from sequential searches. Third, but particularly relevant to this model, costly
diagnosis can lead to delay and delay is a more signicant problem for sequential search than for
xed-sample size search.7
It should also be noted that there is a subtle di¤erence between the commitment problem
behind the common criticism against the xed-sample size approach and the commitment problem
highlighted in this paper. The former is about a consumers inability to commit to the xed-sample
size strategy itself (Rothschild 1974), but the latter is about the consumers inability to commit to
the optimal number of searches. In economic environments where xed-sample size search is more
6MacMinn (1980) is the rst to show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise when consumers engage in xed-
sample size search, but his result relies on cost heterogeneity among sellers. Burdett and Judd (1983) provides a model
of equilibrium price dispersion with ex ante identical consumers and sellers. In the equilibrium price distribution, all
sellers charge positive markups. A fraction of consumers visit one store and purchase, while the remaining fraction
of consumers search two stores and buy from whichever o¤ers the lower price. Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004)
develop an oligopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983) where some consumers search costlessly. They show that
the equilibrium expected price may be constant, increasing or non-monotonic in the number of sellers, depending on
the equilibrium consumerssearch intensity and the existing number of sellers. In particular, they nd that duopoly
yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an innite number of sellers.
7 In the same vein, Morgan and Manning (1985) and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) argue that xed-sample
size search is more appealing when a consumer needs to gather price information quickly.
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advantageous than sequential search, the issue of commitment to strategy does not bite, but the
issue of commitment to the number of searches remains.
Estimation Fee A problem highlighted in this paper is that sellers cannot be compensated
directly for their precontract e¤orts. One may wonder whether charging consumers an estimation
fee will solve the problem. In fact, a large part of French and McKormicks discussion centers
around the use of an estimation fee to recoup the costs of sellerse¤orts. There are two reasons
why the current model does not include an estimation fee. First, as emphasized by Pesendorfer and
Wolinsky (2003), the diagnosis and estimation of the repair cost is a type of "credence" service  the
sellersdiagnosis e¤ort and outcome are unobservable and thus incontractible. Second, French and
McKormicks discussion is based on the assumption that a repair shop has some captive consumers
 due to prohibitively high search costs  who will choose to pay the estimation fee even if other
repair shops can provide costless estimates.8 In the current model, as long as estimation fees are
public, all sellers will end up charging zero estimation fees (or a fee equal to the diagnosis cost of
an unskilled worker). The same result, based on the standard Bertrand style argument, is obtained
in Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) and Wolinsky (2005).
2 Preliminary Results
2.1 A Benchmark Result
A useful point of departure is to consider what happens if t = 0; i.e., sellers can costlessly learn their
production costs. This is not only the assumption of a frictionless market, but also the working
assumption of almost all consumer search models. In this case, based on the standard Bertrand
style argument, we can see that the prices will be set equal to the (realized) production cost as
long as there are at least two sellers. A consumer cannot do better by visiting more sellers because
she cannot get a better o¤er, nor can she do better by visiting just one seller, who will charge
a monopoly price. Therefore, it is su¢ cient for the consumer to visit just two sellers to obtain
competitive price quotes while economizing on the search costs. The consumer earns a surplus of
8One of their remarks - shops in low-income neighborhoods are more likely to charge for estimates because of
potential customerslower search costs - appears to contradict this assumption.
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v   cE   2s; where cE = qcl + (1  q) ch is the expected production cost. This serves as a natural
benchmark for the current analysis.
Zero information cost, however, is not a necessary condition for the above benchmark outcome.
The same outcome can be obtained even if the information cost is positive. It is not di¢ cult to
see why: acquiring information about the production cost allows sellers to earn information rents,
but it is wasteful from the consumers point of view. If she and sellers can contract on the latters
information acquisition e¤orts, then the consumer can prevent sellers from earning information
rents by simply requiring sellers not to acquire product cost information.9 The sellers will again
compete a la Bertrand, with each of them quoting a price of cE and earning zero prots. The
consumer earns the same amount of expected surplus as in the benchmark. Albeit straightforward,
this result demonstrates that the information cost, in itself, does not necessarily cause welfare
loss for the consumer. Rather, any loss of e¢ ciency is due to the inability to contract on sellers
information acquisition e¤orts. Of course, if the cost of e¤ort is so high that it exceeds the private
value of information, which equals q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; then neither seller will make an e¤ort even if
they are not contractually precluded from doing so.
In all above cases, consumer surplus is maximized when the consumer obtains two competing
price quotes. There is no further gain from requesting additional price quotes.10 Therefore, it
does not matter whether the consumer can commit. Accordingly, we summarize the results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Regardless of whether the number of price quotes is publicly observable or non-
contractible private information, consumer surplus is maximized in the unique equilibrium if either
(i) t = 0; or (ii) t  q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; or (iii) the consumer and sellers can contract on the
information acquisition e¤ort. In all three cases, the optimal number of searches is two.
9This requirement may not work if the consumer has private information, which can potentially lead to an adverse
selection problem. Here we assume away consumer private information on the ground that sellers have more expertise
than consumers in the relevant markets.
10 In the case of private information, there will be savings from requesting one fewer price quote so the consumer
might randomize between searching once and twice, giving rise to the same result as in Burdett and Judd (1983),
but this possibility is ruled out here by the assumption that the consumer uses a pure strategy (in the number of
searches).
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Interestingly, Proposition 1 also shows that the optimal number of searches is the same for
extreme values of t. This suggests that the optimal number of searches may not be monotonic in
t, an observation that will be conrmed later in the analysis.
2.2 The Subgame Equilibrium at the "Bidding" Stage
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the more interesting case, in which the cost of infor-
mation acquisition is small but positive, i.e., t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)). In the (stage 2) subgame,
n sellers receive requests for price quotes. When deciding what price to quote, these sellers face a
problem similar to a sealed-bid common value auction: each seller chooses whether or not to acquire
production cost information before submitting a bid without knowing his competitorsbids. This
is not a trivial problem, because a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium does not exist.
Lemma 1 If t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)); no pure strategy equilibrium exists at the "bidding" stage
in which all sellers make an e¤ort to learn the true cost.
Lemma 2 If t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)); no pure strategy equilibrium exists at the "bidding" stage
in which no seller makes an e¤ort to learn the true cost.
Lemma 1 and 2 imply that a symmetric equilibrium in the subgame at the bidding stage must
be in mixed strategies. It involves two randomizations for sellers: rst, sellers randomize between
submitting an informed quote and submitting a blind quote; second, sellers randomize their price
quotes. The solution is given by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 If t 2 (0; q (1  q) (ch   cl)), each seller chooses to acquire information about the pro-
duction cost with a probability of  = 1  

t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t)
1=(n 1)
: If a seller learns that the
production cost is ch; he quotes a price of ch; otherwise he quotes a price according to the distri-
bution of Fl (p) =
1 

t
q(p cl)
1=(n 1)
 , with pl = cl + t=q and pl =
(1 q)ch+q(1 )n 1cl
(1 q)+q(1 )n 1 : If a seller
does not acquire information, he quotes a price according to the price distribution of Fb (p) =
1  1 

q(p cl)
(1 q)(ch p)
 1
n 1   1
 1
; with pb = pl and pb = ch: The expected price is cE + nt:
Figure 1 illustrates how the information cost, t; a¤ects price distributions. The red solid
curve depicts the price distribution when t = 0:2 (ch   cl) and the black dashed curve when
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t = 0:1 (ch   cl) : For each level of information cost, there are two segments of price distributions,
corresponding to informed bids and blind bids.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
p
F(p)
t=0.2 informed bid
t=0.1 informed bid
t=0.1 blind bid
t=0.2 blind bid
Figure 1: The red solid curve depicts the price distribution when t = 0:2 (ch   cl) and the black
dashed curve when t = 0:1 (ch   cl) : For both, q = 1=2:
From the graph, we can see that sellers are more likely to set low blind bids when t is large.
Intuitively, a larger tmakes sellers less likely to acquire costly information and this gives uninformed
sellers a greater chance to win. In response to that, uninformed sellers bid more aggressively. The
e¤ects of a larger t on the bidding behavior of a seller informed of a low cost, however, are more
complicated: on the one hand, having fewer competing bids raises the lower bound of informed
bids; on the other hand, more aggressive bidding by uninformed sellers lowers the upper bound of
informed bids. Therefore, a larger t decreases the degree of dispersion in informed bids.
Lemma 3 also shows that the consumer pays for information costs indirectly in the form of a
higher expected price. This gives us the basic intuition why prices can increase with the number
of searches and why the consumer may want to limit her number of searches. However, this does
not mean that the consumer should always search as little as possible, since a smaller number of
searches will give each seller a greater incentive to earn information rents. In other words, neither
total information costs nor the expected price is monotonic in n: Basically, as n increases, there are
two competing e¤ects on prices: a competitive e¤ect that pushes down prices and a compensation
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e¤ect that drives up prices. The relative importance of these two e¤ects determines the optimal
number of searches.
3 Equilibrium Properties
Consumer surplus is maximized in the benchmark case, but it requires the consumer and sellers
to be able to contract on the latters information acquisition e¤ort. In reality, sellersinformation
acquisition e¤ort is not veriable so the benchmark outcome cannot be obtained. The second best
outcome is for the consumer to commit to the number of searches before sellers o¤er competing bids.
This is possible only if the number of searches is publicly observable (Bagwell 1995). Accordingly,
we analyze two cases, depending on whether n is publicly observable or private information.
3.1 The Number of Price Quotes is Publicly Observable
The consumer surplus can be written as v cE minn2 (t+ s)n: Relative to the benchmark case,
it is lower by minn2 (t+ s)n 2s: The term (t+ s)n captures the overall impact of precontract
costs, including consumer search cost and seller information cost, on consumer welfare. It does not
contribute to sellersprot margin and is merely a waste caused by market frictions, but for the
lack of better names we shall call it the expected markup and denote it by  (n; s; t) : Lemma 4
summarizes how the expected markup (essentially the negative of consumer surplus) varies with
the number of searches for di¤erent combinations of parameter values. For ease of exposition, we
ignore the integer constraint on n in this section.
Lemma 4 For given values of s and t; let  (n) =  (n; s; t) = (t+ s)n and  =   ln t(1 q)q((ch cl)(1 q) t) ;
(i)  (n) monotonically increases with n on (1;1) if 1 + s=t  e 2 (4=   1) ; otherwise,
(ii:a) if s = 0; then  (n) is unimodal on (1;1);
(ii:b) If s > 0; then  (n) has two critical points on (1;1). Denote them by fn1; n2g ; where
n1 < n2;  (n) is maximized at n1 and minimized at n2: If 1 + s=t < e  (2 + 1) ; then n1 <
2 < n2; if 1 + s=t 2
 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  < 1; then n1 < n2  2; if 1 + s=t 2 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  > 1; then 2 < n1 < n2:
(iii) if n!1; then  (n)! ns+ t:
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According to Lemma 4, there are three possible patterns of how the expected markup varies
with the number of searches. Figure 2 illustrates these possibilities. When the information cost t
is small (the blue dashed curve at the bottom), the expected markup monotonically increases with
n; when t is large but s is zero (the black dotted curve in the middle), the expected markup rst
increases with n; then decreases; when t is large and s is positive (the red solid curve at the top),
the expected markup rst increases, then decreases between n1 and n2; and then increases again
for n > n2, where n1 is a local maxima and n2 is a local minima as dened in Lemma 4.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
n
large t, s=0
large t, s>0
small t
Figure 2 (q = 1=2): The expected markup as a function of n: Blue dashed
(t = 0:05 (ch   cl) ; s = 0) ; Black dotted (t = 0:15 (ch   cl) ; s = 0) ; Red solid
(t = 0:15 (ch   cl) ; s = 0:005 (ch   cl)) :
Hence, there are at most three candidates for the optimal number of price quotes: 2, n2; or
innity, with the last candidate, innity, being optimal only if s = 0: Therefore, the optimal number
of price quotes can simply be determined by comparing three numbers,  (2) ;  (n2) and  (1) :
The remaining di¢ culty is to determine  (n2) ; as n2 does not have an analytical solution, but
we rely on studying the monotonicity and oscillation of the expected markup as a function of n to
accomplish the task.
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3.1.1 The Optimal Number of Searches
Suppose that no is the optimal number of price quotes, then we must have no = arg minn2  (n; s; t).
Proposition 2 summarizes the choices of no for di¤erent parameter values of s and t.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the number of price quotes is publicly observable. If s = 0; then
no > 2 if and only if tch cl >
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q ; if s > 0; then n
o > 2 if and only if tch cl >
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q and
s=t < e  (2 + 1)   1; or tch cl <
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q and s=t < e
 2 (4=   1)   1 and 2 (1 + s=t  e ) >
(z+)2
 exp ( z) ; where  =   ln t(1 q)q((ch cl)(1 q) t) and z is the larger root for 
(1+s=t) exp z 1
z(z+) = 1:
Proposition 2 shows that, frequently, the optimal number of searches is two.11 We can see
this result more clearly from Figure 3, where q = 1=2: The optimal number of searches is two in
all regions but the lower-right corner. It is true even when the search cost goes to zero. At rst
glance, the result that a consumer only needs to search twice in a market of homogeneous sellers
may not be surprising. For example, the same result holds in Burdett and Judd (1983) based on
the standard Bertrand style argument. However, there is a crucial di¤erence. In Burdett and Judd
(1983), if a consumer searches twice, then there will be no price dispersion, eliminating the need for
further search. In the present model, a consumer searches twice despite price dispersion, because
additional searches would change sellersbidding strategies, potentially raising prices. It follows
that, if search costs are zero, the "law of one price" will hold in Burdett and Judd (1983), but not
in the present model.
11Honka (2014) nds that consumers get on average 2.96 quotes with the majority of consumers collecting two or
three quotes when purchasing auto insurance policies.
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Figure 3: The Optimal Number of Searches.
Our result is more similar to that of Che and Gale (2003), who nd it optimal to include
only two contestants in a research contest.12 In their model, restricting entry to two competitors
decreases the coordination problem of competing contestants and minimizes the duplication of xed
costs. Similarly, in the present model, limiting the number of bidders creates better incentives at
the information acquisition stage and reduces duplication in e¤orts. However, unlike other papers
with a similar result, the present paper also shows that the consumer can sometimes benet from
expanding her search e¤ort, especially when the search cost is small and the information cost is
relatively large. The rst e¤ect is quite obvious, but the second one is not. When the information
cost rises, one might expect the consumer to search less since she has to indirectly pay for sellers
information costs, but this intuition is incomplete because it ignores the e¤ect of an increase in n on
sellersincentive to acquire information. To see this e¤ect clearly, we plot  (n) = (2) in Figure 4.
The graph illustrates three results: rst, the propensity to acquire information, ; decreases with
n across all ranges of t; second, sellers are less likely to acquire information when t is large; these
two results are obvious. Less obvious is the third result, namely,  decreases at a faster rate when
t is large. This means that increasing the number of searches can potentially reduce the wasteful
and duplicative information acquisition e¤orts for a large t:
12A similar result is also found in auctions with entry (e.g., Harstad 1990, Levin and Smith 1994), and for research
tournaments (Taylor 1995, Fullerton and McAfee 1999).
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Figure 4: y =  (n) = (2) ; when t = 0:02; 0:1; 0:15
3.1.2 Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine the impact of search cost and information cost on the equilibrium
outcome. The rst result is immediate from the preceding discussion.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the number of price quotes is publicly observable, the optimal number
of searches no
(i) decreases with s;
(ii) is non-monotonic in t if s > 0; but increases with t if s = 0:
According to Proposition 3, search costs and information costs have di¤erent impacts on con-
sumerssearch behavior, even though they both contribute to the overall precontract costs. This
means that it is not only the total costs, but also the composition of the costs, that matter to
consumer search. A similar result exists for two-sided markets, but the underlying mechanism is
much di¤erent. In two-sided markets the composition of costs matters because the costs imposed
on one side cannot be fully internalized by the other side of the market, whereas in this model it
matters despite consumersfull internalization of sellerscosts.
Let ' (s; t) = minn2 (t+ s)n denote the minimized expected markup as a function of s and
t: Proposition 4 examines the welfare impact of the two costs.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the number of price quotes is publicly observable, ' (s; t)
(i) monotonically increases with s;
(ii) is unimodal in t.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the consumer benets from a lower search cost. More interestingly,
the consumer can benet from a further increase in the information cost when it is already large.
This directly follows from our earlier observation that a high information cost can discourage sellers
from engaging in wasteful and duplicative information acquisition e¤orts, which are indirectly paid
by the consumer. Another way to understand why the expected total expense is not monotonic in
the information cost is to recall Proposition 1: when t = 0; by denition the cost of information
acquisition e¤ort will be zero; when t  q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; there will be no wasteful expenditure
on information acquisition because the cost exceeds the value of the information. Between the two
extremes, however, there will be positive amounts of (wasteful) information acquisition e¤orts.
Last, we consider the price e¤ects.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the number of price quotes n is publicly observable, the expected price
(i) increases with n if tch cl <
q(1 q)
(1 q)e2+q ;
(ii:a) decreases with n if tch cl 
q(1 q)
(1 q)e2+q and n2  2; (ii:b) increases with n on the interval
of [2; n2] and then decreases with n on (n2;1) if tch cl 
q(1 q)
(1 q)e2+q and n2 > 2;
(iii) increases with s.
In classic models of consumer search, prices are either set before consumer search or at the same
time. This implies that consumerssearch intensity cannot alter price distributions, so the expected
price has to decrease with the number of searches. However, if prices are set after consumer search,
then the e¤ect of more searches on the nal price is not obvious: on the one hand, competition
lowers price; on the other hand, each seller has a smaller chance of being the winning bidder and
so will in equilibrium seek a higher expected prot in the event of winning, which translates into
a higher price. If the second e¤ect is stronger, more searches will result in a high price. This
counterintuitive result has also been noted in a few search models (e.g., Rosenthal 1980, Stahl
1989), but for di¤erent reasons.
The result that the expected price increases with the search cost is more conventional. It
implies that the standard competitive e¤ect dominates the compensation e¤ect if the consumer can
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commit to the optimal number of searches. However, if we relax the assumption of commitment,
the opposite result can sometimes be obtained, as shown in Section 3.2.
3.1.3 Economic Signicance of Information Costs
While the above model generates some interesting results, they will not matter much if the in-
formation cost only has a small impact on consumer welfare. In order to evaluate its economic
signicance, we compare the expected total expense under costly e¤ort to the benchmark case, in
which the total expense is just the expected production cost plus the search costs, cE +2s: To focus
on the impact of information cost, we further assume s = 0, in which case no is either 2 or 1.
Another measure that can be used is the expected price plus the information costs, but it generates
the same qualitative result.13
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Figure 5: ' (s; t) =cE as a function of t= (ch   cl) when q = 1=2: The solid curve has n = 2 and the
dashed n!1:
Figure 5 plots ' (s; t) =cE when q = 1=2; with the the solid curve corresponding to the case
of n = 2 and the dashed n ! 1; so the lower envelope is the expected cost when n is optimally
chosen. As we can see from the graph, the existence of an incontractible information cost can
potentially increase the consumers total expense by more than one half. This clearly demonstrates
that it is not a negligible cost and should be taken seriously not only for its theoretical interests,
13Consumer surplus is a less appropriate measure, because it depends on v; an arbitrary parameter in the model.
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but also for its practical importance. Interestingly, it o¤ers an alternative explanation for why car
buyers obtain signicantly more of the surplus available under customer rebate than under dealer
discount, a nding that is counter to the simple invariance of incidence analogy (Busse, Silva-Risso
and Zettelmeyer 2006). Busse et al. test several hypotheses and nd evidence consistent with the
asymmetric information hypothesis, that is, car buyers are disadvantaged in negotiations because
they are less informed than dealers about the availability of dealer discounts. In contrast, the parties
are symmetrically informed about the availability of customer rebates, which are always publicized
to potential customers, often in prime-time television advertisements. Note that their explanation
is based on the assumption that the information about dealer discounts is readily accessible to
dealers. However, these discounts are often in the form of conditional discounts, depending on
the geographical location and/or the specic equipment package, or trim level. This means that
there may be higher information costs for dealer discounts than for customer rebates.14 Thus, the
result that dealer discounts have a smaller pass-through can also be predicted by our model.
3.2 The Number of Price Quotes is Private Information
As mentioned earlier, if n is non-contractible private information, then sellersbidding strategy de-
pends on their conjecture of the number of competitors; but holding their belief and the correspond-
ing bidding strategy constant, the consumer always benets from having a larger sample size. To see
this, consider the lowest price from obtaining n price quotes, taking the price distribution as given.
Denote it by pmin. Since the overall CDF for a sellers price distribution is F (p) = (1  )Fb (p) +
 (qFl (p) + (1  q)1 (p  ch)) ; where 1 () is the indicator function, Fl (p) and Fb (p) are given in
Lemma 3, the CDF of pmin is Pr(pmin < p) = 1 ni=1 Pr (pi > p) = 1 (1  F (p))n. Assuming that
these expectations are nite, we have E (pmin) =
R1
0 (1  (1  F (p))n) dF (p) =
R1
0 (1  F (p))n dn:
(3.1)
d
dn
E (pmin) =
Z 1
0
(1  F (p))n ln (1  F (p)) dp < 0:
14According to a web site specialized on automobile markets: "Even if you are the only customer in the dealership,
there is still no guarantee youll be able to get a deal o¤er in a ash. If youre taking out a loan, the sales manager
might have to run your credit to get your credit score. Hell call the nance department to get your interest rate,
and then look up specials and incentives on your car to make sure youre getting the right program o¤er for the right
car. Sometimes it just takes a while to get all the information together." Matt Jones, "Behind the Scenes at A Car
Dealership", April 29th, 2016, https://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/behind-the-scenes-at-a-car-dealership.html.
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(3.2)
d2
dn2
E (pmin) =
Z 1
0
(1  F (p))n (ln (1  F (p)))2 dp > 0:
Equation (3:1) and (3:2) show that, given the sellersbidding strategies, a consumer obtains lower
prices as she searches more sellers, but the incremental gain from further price reductions becomes
smaller and smaller. This is essentially the original insight of Stigler (1961). Under the assumption
that the price distributions are completely exogenous, he argues that increased search will yield
positive but diminishing returns as measured by the expected reduction in the minimum asking
price whatever the precise distribution of prices. Figure 6 illustrates (3:1) and (3:2) for the case
where sellers believe they only face one competitor, but the consumer engages in n = 1; 2 or 3
searches (The mathematical expressions are derived in Appendix B.1).
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Figure 6: E (pmin) as a function of t= (ch   cl) : The dashed line on the top represents E (pmin)
when n = 1; the solid one in the middle E (pmin) when n = 2; the dotted one at the bottom
E (pmin) when n = 3: In all case, q = 1=2.
In this section, we model the consumers problem by studying a simultaneous move version of
the game. More specically, we modify the game by assuming that n is not observed by the sellers
when they choose their bids and the consumer cannot precommit to the optimal number of searches.
Instead, sellers must form beliefs about the number of other sellers visited by the consumer. In
the Nash equilibrium, their beliefs must be correct. At the same time, given sellersbeliefs and
pricing strategies, the consumer has no incentive to search more or fewer sellers. Formally, let
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	 (n;m) denote the expected markup, where n represents the actual number of price quotes and m
a sellers belief about the number of price quotes including his own. Let the corresponding lowest
price quote pmin be denoted by E (pminjn;m) : The equilibrium condition is m = arg minn 	 (n;m) ;
where 	 (n;m) = E (pminjn;m) + ns  cE :
Suppose that nPI is the equilibrium number of price quotes when n is private information, then
we must have 	
 
nPI ; nPI
  	  n; nPI for any n; i.e.,
(3.3) E
 
pminjnPI ; nPI

+ nPIs  E  pminjn; nPI+ ns:
By (3:1) and (3:2) ; we know that E (pminjn;m) E (pminjn+ 1;m) is positive and strictly decreases
with n: Condition (3:3) can thus be rewritten as
(3.4) E
 
pminjnPI ; nPI
 E  pminjnPI + 1; nPI  s < E  pminjnPI   1; nPI E  pminjnPI ; nPI ;
which is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a private information equilibrium.
From (3:4), we can easily see that nPI !1 when s! 0; regardless of the optimal number of price
quotes. This observation gives us the basic intuition why the equilibrium number of price quotes
may deviate from the optimum.
Due to the lack of a general analytical solution to expression (B:1), the full characterization
of the private information equilibrium is challenging. Therefore, we use examples to show the
qualitative results. Proposition 6 considers the price impact of search costs.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the number of price quotes n is private information, the expected
equilibrium price may decrease with s if tch cl <
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q :
In contrast to Proposition 5 (iii), the expected price is no longer monotonically increasing in
the search cost if the consumer is unable to commit. This is because, relative to the commitment
case, the search cost has a more direct impact on the number of searches. While a consumer with
commitment must take into account the impact of additional searches on the price distribution, a
consumer without commitment takes the price distribution as given. Consequently, a lower search
cost is more likely to tempt a consumer without the commitment power to engage in additional
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searches, but this can cause sellers to quote higher prices in order to compensate for their smaller
chances of winning the bidding war.
For the same reason, the consumers lack of commitment can also lead to excessive search that
is detrimental to her own welfare. A numerical example is provided in Appendix B.2 to illustrate
this possibility.
4 Conclusion
When consumers search, they incur costs. In order to provide consumers the information they
search for, sellers may also incur costs. This paper departs from the extant literature by assuming
that sellers must make an e¤ort to learn the cost of providing the goods/services before they bid
against other sellers, but the consumer is unable to verify or contract on sellerse¤orts. Despite its
simplicity, the current model is a faithful snapshot of procurement markets. It allows us to derive
a number of results that do not exist in the search models of posted-price markets.
These results suggest that the choice of a small sample size when consumers search is not
necessarily due to high search costs. Recent empirical studies have documented surprisingly few
searches conducted by consumers when shopping for nancial products.15 The lack of consumer
search has been attributed to high search costs and non-price preferences, but it is also consistent
with the existence of information costs. Indeed, as shown in this paper, the optimal number of
searches is often small. Empirical studies that do not take into account sellersinformation costs
may overestimate consumer search costs or the impact of other factors.
This paper is only one step in trying to understand the impact of sellersprecontract cost on
consumer search behavior. For further exploration, it can be extended in a number of directions.
First, if the source of uncertainty in product costs is consumer specic, then a consumer may
have some private information. This is especially true for insurance markets. How consumer
private information a¤ects their search behavior remains an open question.16 Second, the current
model does not consider the possibility that custom solutions exist for di¤erent realizations of the
15Honka (2014) documents evidence from the US auto insurance market, Allen, Clark and Houde (2014) and
Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) from the Canadian and US mortgage markets, respectively, and Stango and Zinman
(2015) from the credit card market.
16 In a model with a similar setup, Lauermann and Wolinsky (2017) assume that an auctioneer has private informa-
tion, which a¤ects the number of bidders she solicits. Their paper, however, does not consider biddersprecontract
costs.
21
production costs. This e¤ectively rules out second-degree price discrimination by a single seller
or vertical di¤erentiation among multiple sellers. Third, the production cost is assumed to be a
binary variable that can be learned with perfect precision. Last, sellers are assumed to compete in
a common value auction.17 Extending the model by relaxing some of these assumptions can be the
basis of fruitful future work.
17 In MacMinn (1980) and Spulber (1995), sellersprice setting is equivalent to bidding in a private value auction.
Price dispersion arises from cost heterogeneity of sellers.
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Appendix
A Proof
Proof of Lemma 1. If all sellers learn the true cost, since this is a common value auction, they will
all quote the same price. As a result, net of the information cost t, their prots are negative. If a
seller deviates by not incurring the information cost and quoting ch, his prot will be zero, so the
deviation is protable.
Proof of Lemma 2. If no sellers learns the true cost, then the price must be cE and sellersprots
will be zero. If a seller learns the true cost, he can charge cE " if the production cost is revealed to
be cl: This happens with a probability of q; so his expected prot is q (cE   cl) = q (1  q) (ch   cl) :
It is a protable deviation if t < q (1  q) (ch   cl).
Proof of Lemma 3. By contradiction, it can be shown that the supports of the two price distributions
Fl (p) and Fb (p) do not overlap in a symmetric equilibrium. Hence, if seller i chooses not to acquire
information, then his expected prot is
i =
pbZ
pb
dFb (p)
0B@ q (p  cl) (1  )n 1

1  ~Fl (p)
n 1
+ (1  q) (p  ch)
Pn 1
k=0
 
n 1
k

k (1  )n 1 k

1  ~Fb (p)
n 1 k
1CA ;
where ~Fl (p) and ~Fb (p) are the corresponding price distributions for the n 1 other sellers. Because
of symmetry, ~Fl (p)  Fl (p) and ~Fb (p)  Fb (p) : In a mixed strategy equilibrium, seller i must be
indi¤erent among all choices of p on the support of

pb; pb

; i.e.,
(A.1)
q (p  cl) (1  )n 1 (1  Fb (p))n 1+(1  q) (p  ch)
n 1X
k=0

n  1
k

k (1  )n 1 k (1  Fb (p))n 1 k = 1;
where 1 is a constant. If seller i chooses to learn the cost, his expected prot can be written as
i = q
plZ
pl
(p  cl)
Pn 1
k=0
 
n 1
k

k (1  )n 1 k

1  ~Fl (p)
k
dFl (p)   t: Applying again the indi¤er-
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ence principle, we have
(A.2) (p  cl)
n 1X
k=0

n  1
k

k (1  )n 1 k (1  Fl (p))k = 2:
Since competing sellers are identical, they must all earn zero expected prots in the equilibrium.
Hence, we must have1 = 0 and2 = t=q: Thus, from (A:1), we can get q (p  cl) (1  )n 1 (1  Fb (p))n 1+
(1  q) (p  ch) (+ (1  ) (1  Fb (p)))n 1 = 0; i.e., Fb (p) = 1  1 

q(p cl)
(1 q)(ch p)
 1
n 1   1
 1
;
from (A:2), we can get (  Fl (p) + (1  ))n 1 = tq(p cl) ; i.e., Fl (p) =

1 

t
q(p cl)
1=(n 1)
=:
Since Fb
 
pb

= 0; we must have q
 
pb   cl

(1  )n 1 + (1  q)  pb   ch = 0: Solving, we obtain
pb =
(1 q)ch+q(1 )n 1cl
(1 q)+q(1 )n 1 : Similarly, we can obtain pb = ch; pl = cl + t=q and pl = cl +
t
q(1 )n 1 : In
addition, we have pl = pb; so cl + tq(1 )n 1 =
(1 q)ch+q(1 )n 1cl
(1 q)+q(1 )n 1 : From this, we can solve for the
information acquisition probability:  = 1 

t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t)
1=(n 1)
: The expected price is
E (p) = n (1  q) ch + nq
Z
pd (1  (1  Fl (p))n) + (1  )n
Z
pd (1  (1  Fb (p))n)
+
n 1X
k=1

n
k

k (1  )n k

(1  q)
Z
pd

1  (1  Fb (p))n k

+ q
Z
pd

1  (1  Fl (p))k

= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0BB@ (1  )
n (1  F )n 1

q + (1  q)
n 1P
k=0
 
n 1
k
 

(1 )(1 F )
k
F 1b (F )
+q
nP
k=1
 
n 1
k 1

k (1  )n k (1  F )k 1 F 1l (F )
1CCA dF
= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0B@ (1  )n (1  F )n 1

q + (1  q)

1 + (1 )(1 F )
n 1
F 1b (F )
+q (1  F )n 1 F 1l (F )
1CA dF
(A.3)
= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0B@ (1  )n (1  F )n 1

qcl + (1  q) ch

1 + (1 )(1 F )
n 1
+t+ q (1  F )n 1 cl
1CA dF
= qcl + (1  q) ch + nt = cE + nt:
Proof of Lemma 4. Let z = = (n  1) ; we have n = =z + 1;  = 1   exp ( z) ; @@t < 0;
and @@nz =   (n 1)2 =  
z2
 : Thus,  (n) can be rewritten as ((1  exp ( = (n  1))) t+ s)n =
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((1  exp ( z (n))) t+ s)n = t

(1+s=t) exp z 1
z

( + z) exp ( z). Hence,  0 (n) = tze z

(1+s=t) exp z 1
z   +z

:
Let  (z; ) =  (1+s=t) exp z 1z(z+) : Thus  
0 (n) 7 0 as long as  (z; ) 7 1: Using LHopitals rule
(Estrada and Pavlovic 2017), we can verify that  (z; ) is convex in z, increases with ; and
limz!0  (z; ) = 
(1+s=t) exp z
2z+ jz=0 = 1 + s=t  1:
(i) Since z (z; ) = 
(+2z)+ez( 2z +z+z2)(1+s=t)
z2(z+)2
;  (z; ) is minimized when z (z; ) = 0;
i.e.,
(A.4) (1 + s=t) exp z =
 + 2z
 + 2z   z   z2 :
Also note that limz!0 z (z; ) =  2 (1 + s=t)  0 if   2: Since  (z; ) is convex in z; (A:4) has
a unique solution. Denote it by z: Hence, minz  (z; ) = 
(1+s=t) exp z 1
z(z+) =

+2z z z2 = 1
if z = 2   : Since z solves (A:4) ; minz  (z; ) = 1 if and only if (A:4) holds when z = 2   ;
i.e., (1 + s=t) exp (2  ) = 4=   1: Denote its solution by : Thus, minz  (z; ) = 1: Since
 (z; ) > 0; we must have minz  (z; )  1 for all    by the Envelope Theorem. Therefore,
 0 (n)  0 if   ; i.e., 1 + s=t  e 2 (4=   1) :
(ii) Now suppose  < : If n is a critical point, then we must have  (z; ) = 1: There are two
critical points if and only if minz  (z; ) < 1:
(ii:a) If s = 0; then  = 2: Since  (z; ) is convex in z, limz!0  (z; ) = 1 and limz!0 z (z; ) <
0: There is a unique solution of z for  (z; ) = 1 on (0;1) : Denote it by z^:  0 (n) > 0 if and only
if z > z^: Thus n^ = =z^ + 1 must be the unique critical point on (1;1) and  0 (n) ? 0 if n 7 n^:
(ii:b) If s > 0; then  < 2; since e 2 (4=   1) decreases with : For  < ; e 2 (4=   1) >
1 + s=t; there are two solutions of z for  (z; ) = 1 on (0;1). Denote them by z1 and z2, where
z1 > z2: Thus,  0 (n) < 0 if and only if z 2 (z2; z1) : Hence, ni = =zi+ 1; i = 1; 2; must be the only
two critical points on (1;1), with  0 (n) < 0 if and only if n 2 (n1; n2) : As a result, n1 maximizes
 (n) and n2 minimizes  (n) : If s=t < e  (2 + 1)   1; then  (z; ) jz= < 1: Since  (z; ) is
convex in z and  (z1; ) =  (z2; ) = 1; we must have z2 <  < z1; i.e., n1 < 2 < n2: If, instead,
s=t > e  (2 + 1) 1; then  (z; ) jz= > 1. It is easy to verify that e  (2 + 1) < e 2 (4=   1)
if  6= 1 and e  (2 + 1) = e 2 (4=   1) = 3=e if  = 1. Since z (z; ) jz= = 0 when  = 1 and
z (z; ) > 0; we must have z (z; ) jz= ? 0 when  ? 1: Thus, if  < 1; we have z (z; ) jz= < 0;
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so  < z2 < z1; i.e., n1 < n2 < 2; otherwise, z2 < z1 < ; i.e., 2 < n1 < n2: Last, if  = 1; then we
cannot have e  (2 + 1) < 1 + s=t < e 2 (4=   1) :
(iii) limn!1 n = limz!0 (1  e z) +zz = limz!0 e z (z+)
2
 = ; so limn!1 (t+ s)n = t +
sn:
Proof of Proposition 2. If s = 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:a) ; we only need to compare  (2) and  (1) :
By Lemma 4 (iii), limn!1  (n) = t; whereas  (2) = 2t

1 

t(1 q)
q((ch cl)(1 q) t)

: Since 1  
exp ( ) < =2 for  > 1: 594; we have  (2) < limn!1  (n) if and only if t(1 q)q((ch cl)(1 q) t) <
exp ( 1:594) ; i.e., t < q(1 q)4:92(1 q)+q (ch   cl) : The reason why s = 0 has to be considered as a special
case is due its di¤erent asymptotic behavior: limn!1  0 (n) = s if s > 0; but  0 (n) < 0 and
limn!1  0 (n) = 0 if s = 0:
If s > 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:b) ; there are four possibilities:
(i)  (n) is increasing on (1;1) when  > ; i.e., tch cl 
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q : Hence, n
o = 2:
(ii) n1 < 2 < n2 when 1+s=t < e  (2 + 1) : Since  (n) is decreasing on the interval of [2; n2] ;
 (n2) <  (2) : Therefore, no = n2 > 2:
(iii) n1 < n2 < 2 when 1 + s=t 2
 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  < 1: Since  (n) is
increasing on the interval of (n2;1) ;  (n2) <  (2) < limn!1  (n) : In addition, no  2; so we
must have no = 2:
(iv) 2 < n1 < n2 when 1 + s=t 2
 
e  (2 + 1) ; e 2 (4=   1) and  > 1: Since  (n)
increases on [2; n1] and then decreases on [n1; n2] ; no = arg minn2f2;n2g  (n) : Since  (2) =
(1+s=t) exp z 1
z

( + z) exp ( z) jz= = 2 (1 + s=t  e ) and  (n2) =

(1+s=t) exp z 1
z

( + z) exp ( z)
where  (1+s=t) exp z 1z(z+) = 1; n
o > 2 if 2 (1 + s=t  e ) > (z+)2 exp ( z) :
Therefore, in order for no > 2; if  < 1; i.e., tch cl >
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q ; then we must have s=t <
e  (2 + 1)   1; if  > 1; i.e., tch cl <
q(1 q)
(1 q)e+q ; then we must have s=t < e
 2 (4=   1)   1 and
2 (1 + s=t  e ) > (z+)2 exp ( z) ; where zis the solution to (A:4) :
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Suppose that no changes to no0 and n2 changes to n02 when s increases
to s0 > s: To prove that no is (weakly) decreasing in s, we need to show no0  no:
If s = 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:a) ; no = arg minn2f2;1g  (n; 0; t) and no0 = arg minn2f2;n02g  (n; s
0; t) :
We only need to prove that no0 cannot be n02 > 2 when no = 2; i.e.,  (n02; s0; t) >  (2; s0; t) when
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 (n02; 0; t) >  (2; 0; t) ; but this is true because  (n02; s0; t) =  (n02; 0; t) + n02s0 >  (2; 0; t) + 2s0 =
 (2; s0; t) :
If s > 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:b) ; no = arg minn2f2;n2g  (n; s; t) and n
o0 = arg minn2f2;n02g  (n; s
0; t) :
By the Envelope theorem,
(A.5) sign
dn2
ds
= sign  @
2
@n@s
 (n; s; t) = ( ) ;
since @
2
@n@s (n; s; t) = 1: Hence, n
0
2 < n2: Suppose that n
o = n2; then no0 will be greater than no
only if n02 > no; but n02 < n2 = no by (A:5). Suppose that no = 2; then no0 will be greater than no
only if n02 > 2; i.e.,  (2; s; t) <  (n2; s; t) and  (2; s0; t) >  (n02; s0; t) ; but  (2; s0; t) =  (2; s; t) +
2 (s0   s) <  (n2; s; t)+2 (s0   s)   (n2; s; t)+n02 (s0   s) <  (n02; s; t)+n2 (s0   s) =  (n02; s0; t) ;
contradiction.
(ii) is immediate from Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) By Lemma 4; ' (s; t) = min f (2) ;  (n2) ;  (1)g : By the Envelope
Theorem, dds (n2) = n2 > 0: At the same time,
d
ds (2) = 2 > 0 and
d
ds (1) = n > 0: Therefore,
@
@s' (s; t) > 0:
(ii) First, ddt (2) =
@
@t

1  t(1 q)q((1 q) t)

t = t
2 2t(1 q)+q(1 q)2
q(1 q t)2 ;
d2
dt2
 (2) = @
2
@t2

1  t(1 q)q((1 q) t)

t =
 2q (1 q)
3
(1 q t)3 < 0; so  (2) increases with t if and only if t < 1 q 
q
(1  q)3: Second, by the Envelope
Theorem, ddt (n2) =
@
@t (1  exp ( = (n2   1))) tn2 =  n2

e
  
n2 1   1

@
@t < 0; i.e.,  (n2) de-
creases with t: Third, by Lemma 4 (iii) ; d
2
dt2
 (1) = @2
@t2

 t ln t(1 q)q((1 q) t)

=  1t (1 q)
2
(1 q t)2 < 0: If s >
0; by Lemma 4 (ii:b) ; ' (s; t) = min f (2) ;  (n2)g ; Since  (2) and  (n2) are both quasi-concave,
' (s; t) must be quasi-concave in t. If s = 0; by Lemma 4 (ii:a) ; ' (s; t) = min f (2) ;  (1)g : Since
 (2) and  (1) are both concave in t, ' (s; t) must be concave in t: Last, since ' (s; 0) = ' (s; t) ;
where t = q (1  q) (ch   cl) ; ' (s; t) must be unimodal in t:
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) and (ii) are immediate from the proof of Lemma 4 (i) and (ii:a) :
(iii) By the Envelope theorem, ddsE (pjn = n2) = dds (n2)   ddsn2s = n2   n2   sdn2ds  0:
At the same time, E (pjn = 2) is a constant with respect to s. By Proposition 3, no decreases
with s: This means that, when s increases to s0; we cannot have no = 2 and no0 = n2 > 2:
Hence, the only possibility for a price decreases after an increase in s is to have  (n2) <  (2)
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but E (pjn = n2) > E (pjn = 2) : If this is true, then we must have  (n2)   2s <  (2)   2s =
E (pjn = 2) < E (pjn = n2) =  (n2)  n2s; contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that initially E (pminj2; 2)   E (pminj3; 2) < s < E (pminj1; 2)  
E (pminj2; 2) ; then we must have nPI = 2 according to (3:4) and E (pminj2; 2) = cE + (2) 2s: If s
decreases to 0; then nPI > 2; but E
 
pminjnPI ; nPI

= cE+	
 
nPI ; nPI

= cE+ 
 
nPI

> cE+ (2)
for n > 2 if tch cl <
q(1 q)
4:92(1 q)+q by Proposition 2.
B Additional Results When the Number of Price Quotes is Pri-
vate Information
B.1 The Expected Price
Let E (pminjn;m) denote the lowest price quoted by n sellers when each of them believes that the
consumer obtains m price quotes. Also let Fl;m (p) denote the corresponding price distribution of
informed bids, Fb;m (p) that of blind bids, and  the probability of a seller choosing to acquire
information about the production cost. From (A:3) ; we obtain that
E (pminjn;m)
= n (1  q) ch + nq
Z
pd (1  (1  Fl;m (p))n) + (1  )n
Z
pd (1  (1  Fb;m (p))n)
+
n 1X
k=1

n
k

k (1  )n k

(1  q)
Z
pd

1  (1  Fb;m (p))n k

+ q
Z
pd

1  (1  Fl;m (p))k

= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0B@ q (1  F )n 1 F 1l;m (F )
+ (1  )n (1  F )n 1

q + (1  q)


(1 )(1 F ) + 1
n 1
F 1b;m (F )
1CA dF
= n (1  q) ch + n
Z 1
0
0BB@ q (1  F )
n 1

cl +
t=q
(1 F )m 1

+ (1  )n (1  F )n 1


q + (1  q)


(1 )(1 F ) + 1
n 1 qcl+(1 q)ch (1 )(1 F )+1m 1
q+(1 q)


(1 )(1 F )+1
m 1
1CCA dF
= n (1  q) ch + qcl (1  (1  )n) + n
Z 1
0
t (1  F )n m dF
(B.1)
+ n
Z 1 
0
Gn 1

q + (1  q)

G
+ 1
n 1 qcl + (1  q) ch   G + 1m 1
q + (1  q)   G + 1m 1
!
dG:
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From (B:1), we can get E (pminj1; 2) = cE+q (1  q) (ch   cl) ln 1 q(1 q) t ln (1  ) ; E (pminj2; 2) =
cE + 2t and E (pminj3; 2) = cE + 3t (1  =2) + 3q (1  q) (ch   cl)


2q (1  q) ln 1 q(1 q)   12 (1  ) (1  + 2q)

: It is not di¢ cult to verify that (3:1) and (3:2)
hold.
B.2 Excessive Search
Example 1 Consider the following parameter values: q = 1=2; cl = 0, ch = 1 and t = 0:15: It is
not di¢ cult to verify by Proposition 2 that no = 2 as long as s > 0:023:
However, from (B:1), we can get E (pminj2; 3) = 2=2 2t ln (1  )+12 2+12+122 arctan  2+ +
1
8
2 = 0:706; E (pminj3; 3) = 0:655; and E (pminj3; 4) =  234 22t+4t+ 123+ 122  13+ 12 + 124
arctan  2+ +
1
8
4 = 0:623: Thus, if s 2 (0:032 ; 0:051) ; then n = 3 is an equilibrium that involves
excessive search.
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